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1 Introduction
Multinational tax avoidance has been a subject of political discussion in recent years,
as there is growing academic evidence on how little tax multinational corporations (MNCs)
pay (Bilicka, 2019; Torslov et al., 2018). The political pressure has been exacerbated by
the revelations from Panama and Paradise papers in 2015 that exposed details of some of
the tax avoidance schemes to the public. This spurred some countries to introduce stricter
rules to limit the extent of tax avoidance by MNCs. However, such restrictions in practice
affect not only profit-shifting activities, but also result in reallocation of real activities, such
as investment and employment, away from countries introducing those rules (Bilicka et al.,
2020; Serrato, 2018). Hence, these reallocations may affect long-run regional employment
and growth and exacerbate regional inequalities. As such, it is critical to understand whether
and how such restrictions affect local domestic markets.
In this paper, I analyze the effects of an antitax avoidance regulation on employment in
regions where MNCs affected by the regulation are located. To provide causal evidence, I
leverage the introduction of the worldwide debt cap rule (WDC) in the United Kingdom
in 2010 as a natural experiment. The WDC was aimed at tackling debt shifting by MNCs
by setting up a maximum ratio of debt allowed to be held in the United Kingdom rela-
tive to the overall debt for each MNC. Interest expenses above the so-called gateway ratio
were disallowed for deductibility purposes, substantially increasing the cost of capital in the
United Kingdom for MNCs that failed the gateway test. These worldwide antitax avoidance
measures are becoming more prominent policy tools, with the United States implementing
similar restrictions in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in December 2017. Bilicka et al. (2020)
show that although the WDC reduced excessive borrowing in the United Kingdom, it led
to debt shifting toward foreign subsidiaries. This reallocation of debt was followed by the
reallocation of real business activities. Affected MNCs shrank the size of total assets, fixed
assets, and employment they held in the United Kingdom, while expanding elsewhere.
I take advantage of the same reform but focus on the local labor market implications
of the employment reallocation from the United Kingdom to foreign countries that resulted
from this antitax avoidance restriction. Consistent with Slemrod (1992) hierarchy of behav-
ioral responses, when firms can easily shift profits between jurisdictions, they respond to
regulations moving paper profits. However, if a regulation prohibits them from doing so,
their accounting responses may result in reallocations of real activities. This is what Bilicka
et al. (2020) find for the WDC in the United Kingdom, suggesting the effectiveness of that
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regulation in limiting profit shifting. From a policy perspective, shifts in the allocation of
debt and consequently profits between subsidiaries of MNCs matter for tax revenue collec-
tion across countries and regions. This effect could be exacerbated if the reallocation of debt
generates distortions in the firm’s real business activities, especially employment. If MNCs
employ a large part of the population in a particular region, this may disproportionately
affect local employment levels and have spillover effects for regional growth.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I show how the WDC affects firm-level employ-
ment across subsidiaries belonging to the affected MNCs. This effectively replicates Bilicka
et al. (2020), focusing on the longer panel of employment data. I show that affected MNCs
reduced employment in the United Kingdom by 8.5 percent and increased employment in
their foreign subsidiaries by 8.6 percent between 2010 and 2018. These estimates are larger
than in Bilicka et al. (2020) suggesting the long-run effects of this reform on the employment
of affected MNCs. I also show an increase in domestic employment in the United Kingdom,
but this is not concentrated in regions more exposed to the WDC. This suggests no substi-
tution toward domestic labor, at least locally. To complement these findings, I explore the
regional and industrial variation that the data offer. I show a large decline in employment in
London and a substantial heterogeneity in local labor market responses across U.K. counties.
The large labor decline in London is concentrated among service firms. This is consistent
with a potentially high mobility of employees in service sectors and as a consequence a lower
cost of reallocation or rehiring new employees.
In the second part of the paper, I focus on the regional implications of this employment
reallocation. To do so, I use the location of MNCs subsidiaries in the United Kingdom
and in foreign countries, assign firms to county-city regions, and match these with regional
jobs data from Eurostat. This means that the foreign implications presented here are only
relevant for European Union countries for which I have data.1 Treated regions are those
that have at least one MNC that failed the gateway test and reported employment in their
financial statement.2 For the remainder of the paper, I refer to those treated regions, as
exposed regions. First, I use regional employment statistics and show that the number of
jobs available in exposed regions in the United Kingdom declined following the WDC. I find
similar increase in unemployment rate and reduction in regional GDP growth. Second, within
1The list of countries is as follows: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden,
Slovenia, Slovakia. They are also graphed in Figure A3.
2As an alternative treatment group, I use regions where at least one MNC failed the gateway test and
reduced their employment in the United Kingdom as a result.
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each region, I aggregate the firm-level employment data and show that in exposed regions
the total employment by MNCs declined relative to regions not exposed to WDC. This
complements the results using regional data. In placebo tests, I show no effects for regions
that were simply exposed to MNCs in general. In turn, in foreign European countries,
in regions exposed to WDC, I find an increase in the number of jobs available. These
results suggest that the reallocation of labor by MNCs that employ a large proportion of the
population locally affects local labor markets by reducing the number of jobs available and
creating unemployment.
The size of the local labor market effect abroad I estimate is larger than the one in
the United Kingdom. This occurs for three reasons. First, as MNCs expand in the foreign
locations where they reallocate employment, local labor markets can experience productivity
gains through supply-chain linkages (Alfaro and Chen, 2018; Javorcik, 2004). This may affect
local domestic firms as well, increasing local labor market size and reducing unemployment.
Note that I do not have sufficient prereform data to investigate the domestic labor effects
in foreign countries. Second, the initial decline in firm-level employment by MNCs in the
United Kingdom persist until 2015, after which I observe an increase. This suggests that
the negative shock is not permanent and that affected firms eventually offset the effects of
WDC. Third, in the United Kingdom, I also find that domestic firms increased the number
of people they employed, but not necessarily in the regions exposed to WDC. This suggests
that domestic firms did not benefit from this negative shock by substituting labor locally,
unlike in Desai et al. (2009). However, it is entirely plausible that domestic labor substitution
occurred in regions not exposed to WDC; that is, not locally.
This paper provides a new contribution to the literature on the effects of antitax avoid-
ance restrictions on local labor markets. Two papers closest to this one are Bilicka et al.
(2020) and Serrato (2018), the former of which analyzes the effects of the WDC reform for
employment reallocation at the firm level. They stop short of analyzing the consequences
of these reallocations for the local labor markets. Serrato (2018) shows that the repeal of a
tax code that allowed U.S. MNCs to exclude income from Puerto Rico from U.S. corporate
taxes led them to shift investment and employment away from the United States. He uses
regional unemployment data for the United States to show that firm-level responses affected
local labor markets that were more exposed to the reform. My results differ in three dimen-
sions. First, the policy I analyze is a more general regulation adopted by other countries to
counteract profit shifting. For example, in 2017 the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act included
provisions to limit interest deductibility of MNCs, while in 2019, the European Commission
3
recommended the implementation of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, which sets similar
interest deductibility limitations.3 Thus, my findings are likely to have broader policy im-
plications for European and U.S. policy, as more countries are adopting such regulations.
Second, the U.S. reform applied to a domestic tax haven, thus it is very specific in its nature.
The WDC applied to profit shifting globally. Third, unlike Serrato (2018), whose analysis
is restricted to considering the effect of antitax avoidance regulation in a country that im-
plemented this regulation, I consider the implications to foreign countries as well. Thus, I
can show that a reduction in employment in a U.K. subsidiary of a multinational that has
local labor market implications in the United Kingdom generates a much larger increase in
employment in a local labor market where another subsidiary of that firm is located. This
suggests a reallocation of labor across markets and asymmetries in how negative and positive
shocks are amplified through regional markets. This evidence is consistent with Giroud and
Mueller (2019), who show similar shock propagation to local labor markets, but within the
United States and using consumer demand shocks.
More broadly, this paper adds to several strands of literature. First, there is evidence
that profit shifting elicits real responses by MNCs, especially in terms of investment (Becker
and Riedel, 2012; Egger and Wamser, 2015; Grubert and Slemrod, 1998; Mintz and Smart,
2004). While Desai et al. (2009) show that domestic and foreign investment are complements,
Kovak et al. (2017) show that this does not necessarily translate to employment. These
results focus on firm-level implications, while the present paper addresses local labor market
consequences of such real responses. Second, I add to a growing literature that examines how
MNCs respond to economic and policy shocks and how these shocks propagate across their
subsidiaries, affecting the local and global economy (Almedia et al., 2015; Biermann, 2019;
Boutin et al., 2013; Desai et al., 2007; Garrett et al., 2020; Giroud and Mueller, 2015, 2016,
2019; Huber, 2018; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2016; Santioni et al., 2017). The literature on shock
propagation focuses on how shocks to one establishment, through the firm network, affect
the rest of the firm. The shocks that this literature analyzes are often linked to consumer
demand (Giroud and Mueller, 2019) or investment opportunities (Giroud and Mueller, 2015).
This literature does not consider the implications of antitax avoidance restrictions and how
they propagate across firm subsidiaries. Third, this paper also relates to a large body of
trade literature on spillover effects of multinationals on domestic markets and producers.
The evidence from the literature is mixed, with Harrison and Aitken (1999) and Lu et al.
3For more details see: EU commissionhttps://ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/business/company −
tax/anti− tax− avoidance− package/anti− tax− avoidance− directiveen.
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(2017) finding negative effects, while Javorcik (2004), Haskel et al. (2007), Alfaro and Chen
(2018), Keller and Yeaple (2009), Figlio and Blonigen (2000), Kee (2015), and many others
finding positive effects. More recently, Setzler and Tintelnot (2019) show positive spillover
effects of foreign MNCs on wages of domestic firms. My paper is related to those findings
as I show that negative shocks to MNCs affect local labor markets positively, while I find
no support that expansion of real operations by affected MNCs abroad has any significant
spillover effects on domestic firms’ employment.
2 Policy Context
Profit shifting has been at the forefront of political debate, as countries try to curb the
ability of MNCs to move profits away from high-tax to low-tax jurisdictions. The three
most popular profit-shifting methods include debt shifting (Desai et al., 2004; Huizinga
et al., 2008), transfer pricing, (Cristea and Nguyen, 2016; Davies et al., 2018) and location
of patents in low-tax jurisdictions (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011). Debt shifting relies on
subsidiaries of MNCs located in low-tax countries lending money internally to subsidiaries
located in high tax-countries and using interest deductibility to reduce taxable profits in
high-tax countries. Transfer pricing relies on mispricing of goods when traded internally so
that their costs can be written off against profits in high-tax countries. Location of patents
in low-tax countries relies on firms’ ability to lease those patents and pay royalties to low-tax
countries at the same time reducing their taxable profits in high-tax countries.
Many countries already have restrictions in place to limit the extent to which MNCs
can use those various profit-shifting strategies. For example, thin-capitalization rules set up
a fixed ratio, such as the debt-to-equity ratio or the interest coverage ratio, and interest
expense associated with debt exceeding the ratio is often disallowed for a tax deduction.
These rules consider each subsidiary of an MNC separately, and despite being shown to be
effective at reducing debt shifting (Blouin et al., 2014; Buettner et al., 2012), they have
been widely criticized, as firms are able to circumvent those rules easily. Transfer pricing
restrictions exist too, with countries agreeing to uphold “arms-pricing” restrictions, where
firms have to show that the goods they trade internally have a price at which they would
trade on the external market. Finally, patent location and the use of tax havens is being
restricted by Controlled Foreign Company rules (Clifford, 2019).
In January 2010, the U.K. tax authority (the HMRC) introduced the WDC to restrict
the generous tax deductions for financing expenses enjoyed by MNCs in the United King-
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dom. These new rules were meant to complement the use of thin-capitalization rules. This
worldwide approach evaluates the MNCs’ allocation of debt across affiliates by comparing
the amount of debt located in each host country to a worldwide consolidated benchmark. In
case of the United Kingdom, this benchmark was set to be worldwide debt in 2010. This was
replaced in April 2017 by Earnings before interest tax and depreciation (EBITDA). These
rules are likely to be more effective, given that the entire structure of MNCs debt needs to
be adjusted to circumvent those (Desai and Dharmapala, 2015; Dharmapala, 2014).
The WDC applied to “relevant” MNCs with a corporate tax residence in the United
Kingdom. The relevance was determined by ownership status, and only affiliates that were
owned by more than 75 percent were affected by the reform. Further, the MNCs subject to
this reform had to have more than 250 employees, above e50m turnover, and/or above e43m
balance sheet total assets. As such, the affected firms were large and employed a substantial
number of people in the United Kingdom. The WDC required MNCs to calculate its net
U.K. debt across all of their “relevant” subsidiaries and divide that by worldwide gross debt.
If the ratio exceeded 75 percent, the interest deduction was disallowed for the exceeding level
of interest expenses. Bilicka et al. (2020) discuss in detail the particular types of liabilities
and assets that form the net U.K. debt.
The timing of the WDC coincides with the introduction of territorial tax reform in the
United Kingdom in 2009. This reform exempts dividend repatriation by MNCs from being
taxed in the United Kingdom and has been shown to increase dividend repatriation (Egger
et al., 2015), payouts to shareholders (Arena and Kutner, 2015), and shifting profits to low
tax countries (Langenmayr and Liu, 2020). Further, U.K. government introduced a package
of statutory corporate tax rate cuts that reduced its tax rate to 20 percent in 2015 and to 19
percent by 2018. Bilicka et al. (2020) already carefully show that these two reforms did not
affect firms that failed the gateway test differently; hence, I do not focus on the confounding
effects of those reforms in this paper.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
To examine the effects of the WDC on labor markets, I use the dataset from Bilicka et al.
(2020) and complement it with information on the location of multinational affiliates and
hand-collected regional jobs and unemployment data. The firm-level data with the ownership
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and financial information come from Bureau van Dijk (BvD) Osiris matched with Orbis for
non-U.K. financials and FAME for U.K. financials. I use FAME data for the U.K. portion
of this study, as FAME offers much more detailed financial information that allows me to
construct the gateway test ratios for firms with affiliates in the United Kingdom following
the HMRC guidance exactly. I use these gateway test ratios to construct treatment and
control groups and then match into the parent and foreign subsidiary information for firms
from the ORBIS data. Combining these data sources together, the benchmark sample covers
financial data for MNCs, both at the group level and the subsidiary level, during the period
2007–2018.
The regional U.K. data is at the county-city level (NUTS3 regions) and come from Eu-
rostat. I have information on population, employment, GDP, number of jobs, and unem-
ployment rate at the county-city level, such as Manchester, Aberdeen, or Bristol and their
surrounding regions. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows distribution and borders of county-
cities in the United Kingdom. Since the unemployment data come from Eurostat, my sample
is limited to analyzing the local labor market implications for the United Kingdom and for
foreign labor markets located in Europe.4 I test the validity of the conclusions offered by the
regional data by aggregating firm-level data at the county-city levels for the sample where I
have Eurostat data and for the whole sample of firms from Orbis. In this paper, I focus on
three variables in particular: number of jobs, unemployment rate, and regional GDP. Note
that for some cities, data were not collected in all years. In those cases, I fill in the data
by calculating an average of the surrounding time periods. For example, if employment in
Aberdeen was 85,000 in 2008 and 90,000 in 2011, I calculate it to be 87,500 in both 2009
and 2010.
3.2 Empirical strategy
Firm level The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. First, I analyze the firm-level
effect of the reform on employment of affected MNCs in a difference-in-differences frame-
work. MNCs that failed the gateway test in 2010 are in the treated group, while those
that passed the test are in the control group. This replicates Bilicka et al. (2020), using a
longer postreform time series and using affiliate-level information instead of aggregating at
4The following countries have county-city employment data in Eurostat: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Ger-
many, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia, United Kingdom.
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the MNC level.5 I estimate the following model:
Yi,j,s,t = α + β × Failedi × Postt + ψt + κi + εi,j,t, (1)
where Yi,j,s,t is employment in subsidiary j that belongs to multinational i, located in host
country s, in year t. Failedi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if MNC i failed the gateway
test in 2010 and 0 otherwise, Postt is a dummy variable that equals 1 from 2010 onward,
ψt is the time fixed effect, κi is the subsidiary fixed effect, and εi,j,t is the error term. The
parameter of interest is β, which captures the effect of the WDC on MNCs’ employment. In
the empirical analysis I distinguish between U.K. subsidiaries and foreign subsidiaries, as we
would expect the effects to be opposite for those two types of affiliates.
Regional level Second, I use regional statistics to understand the effect of WDC on
regional employment. I distinguish between two types of regions that theoretically should
have been more affected by the reform: 1) regions where a subsidiary of an MNC’s firm that
failed the gateway test is located and it reports employment numbers, 2) regions where such
MNCs also reduced their employment in the United Kingdom following the WDC. In the
main part of the paper, I focus on the first identification strategy but show corresponding
results from the second strategy in the Appendix. Further, I use placebo regions with more
employment by MNCs to see whether the effects I observe could simply be the effect of
exposure to MNCs. As such, I estimate the following models:
Yk,t = α + βPostt ×Regionk + ψt + µk + εi,j,s,t (2)
where Yk,t is employment in region k, in year t. Postt is a dummy variable that equals one
from 2010 onward; Regionk is a dummy equal to 1 for treated regions; i.e. those with more
exposure to firms that failed the gateway test. ψt is the time fixed effect, µk is region fixed
effect, and εk,t is the error term. The parameter of interest is β, which captures the effect of
the WDC employment in regions more exposed to WDC. As a validation, I also aggregate
firm-level data at the regional level by calculating the total number of employees for MNCs
in each city and run the same set of regional regression as outlined in Equation (2).
5I need to use affiliate level information here, because some MNCs have multiple subsidiaries in the United
Kingdom and I match their location to the regional unemployment data.
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3.3 Sample description
For the regional analysis to be valid, we require the exposed regions to have similar
observable characteristics to the regions that were not exposed to WDC prior to the reform.
Table 1 shows regional descriptive statistics using the main identification strategy; in Panel
A, I compare regions that were exposed to WDC and those that were not in the United
Kingdom; in Panel B, I do the same for foreign regions. We can see that there is no
statistically significant difference between regions that were exposed to WDC and those that
were not in terms of population, number of employed people, activity rate, unemployment
rate and regional GDP in the United Kingdom. In Figure A1, I show the distribution of
intensity of exposure to WDC by region, and in Figure A2, I include a map of all regions in
the United Kingdom for which data for regional employment is collected, how many people
were employed in each region and the unemployment rate. The list of regions with available
data is included in Table A3 in the Appendix.
For foreign regions, there is no difference between regions that were exposed to WDC
and those that were not in terms of population, number of employed people and regional
GDP prior to WDC. Regions that were exposed to the WDC had higher activity rate and
lower unemployment rate though. In Figure A3, I show the countries for which I have the
regional unemployment data available.
4 Firm-Level Results
In Table 2 I report results using firm-level data. In column 1 I include U.K. subsidiaries
of MNCs, in column 2 I include domestic firms, and in column 3 I include only foreign
subsidiaries belonging to MNCs that had at least one U.K. affiliate in 2010. In columns 1
and 3 treated is a dummy equal to 1 when the MNC was exposed to WDC, in column 2,
treated is a dummy equal to 1 when the region was exposed to WDC.
Consistent with Bilicka et al. (2020), I show that after the WDC there was a significant
reduction in employment in subsidiaries belonging to the affected MNCs in the United King-
dom. After 2010, there was also an increase in the number of people employed by domestic
firms in the United Kingdom, but not necessarily in regions exposed to WDC. Further, there
was an increase in the number of people employed by affected MNCs abroad. The magni-
tudes of the U.K. reduction and foreign increase are very similar; MNCs reduced employment
in the United Kingdom by 8.5 percent and increased that abroad by 8.6 percent. There are
two reasons why these estimates are different than Bilicka et al. (2020). First, in this paper,
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I consider a longer sample period to show the lasting effect of the WDC of employment. Sec-
ond, to match MNC affiliates with regional data I have to use subsidiary-level data instead
of aggregating at the MNC level in the United Kingdom.
In Figure 1, I plot the dynamic evolution of the employment changes at the firm level.
We can see that before the WDC, employment of affected and unaffected MNCs evolved
similarly, both in the United Kingdom (Panel A) and abroad (Panel B). After the WDC,
employment in the control group has remained stable, while in the United Kingdom the
number of people employed by affected MNCs has gradually declined. The opposite happened
in foreign countries. Note that from 2016 onward the difference between treated and control
groups employment in the United Kingdom is not statistically significant. Part of this can
be attributed to a gradual increase in the number of people employed by domestic firms
in the United Kingdom (Panel C) that increased in 2016. Those firms are likely picking
up some of the unemployment that was created by the MNCs that reduced the number of
people they employed. Note that the increase in employment amongst domestic firms in the
United Kingdom that I estimate in column 2 in Table 2 is concentrated outside of the regions
exposed to the WDC. This could mean that there is a substitution between domestic and
multinational firms’ employment, but that does not necessarily need to occur regionally.
Mechanism What could be driving the observed effects? In Figure 2, I explore the regional
variation in labor reallocation. As such, I estimate the effect of WDC separately for firms
in London and outside of London and plot those coefficient estimates in Panel A. Most of
the employment decline in the United Kingdom is driven by firms located in London. They
see a 22 percent decline in the number of people employed by treated firms. Panel B in that
figure demonstrates that this is driven by a gradual fall in employment by treated firms and
we do not see any effect for the control group firms in London. This suggests no substitution
effect between firms that were affected by WDC and those that were not in London. Also, in
Panel C, I do not find a significant reduction in the average employment outside of London.
What is different about firms in London? Forty-one percent of London firms in 2010
belong to service industry, 23 percent to finance, 9.5 percent are construction, and 8.3 percent
manufacturing. Outside of London only 26 percent of firms are services, while 29 percent
are manufacturing and 16.5 percent finance. In Figure 3, I divide the sample of subsidiaries
in London into sectors in which these firms operate and estimate the effect of the reform
for each sector separately. I show that the negative effect for London is driven primarily by
service and construction firms. Those are the only two significant coefficient estimates in
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Panel A. This is perhaps not surprising, as service firms are likely to be most mobile when
it comes to capital and employment and may be able to relocate most efficiently and at the
lowest cost.
In Panel B, I divide the sample of subsidiaries outside of London into sectors and estimate
the effect of WDC within each sector separately. Even though the average estimate for
employment reallocation for outside of London in Panel A of Figure 2 is not statistically
significant from zero, there is a substantial sectoral heterogeneity here. I show that service
firms actually reduce their employment outside of London too and the magnitude of this
effect is comparable to those London firms. This again points toward capital mobility being
important when firms are relocating their operations. This is consistent with the fact that I
find no effect for manufacturing or wholesale trade sectors, which have much lower capital
mobility. In Panel C in Figure 3, I show that the only sector where we see a significant
increase in employment abroad is a service sector too.6
In unreported exercises, I check whether the decline in employment in the service sector
is linked with increase in other sectors, especially among firms unaffected by WDC. I find no
such effects, which suggests that the observed effect is about service firms reallocating away
from the United Kingdom to more preferable foreign locations and not about substitution
between sectors and firm types.
5 Regional Estimates
To understand the implications of firm-level reallocation of employment on local labor
markets, I proceed in two steps. First, I use regional statistics for the number of jobs
available. Second, I aggregate firm-level data at the county-city level and show results using
aggregate number of people employed by MNCs in each region.
In Table 3 I show results using the number of jobs available. In all columns I control for
logarithm of population to account for changes in population across regions. In Panel A, I
show results for U.K. regions and in Panel B for foreign regions. I find that the number of
jobs available in the United Kingdom declined in the exposed regions, while increasing in
the foreign regions. These results are consistent with the firm-level results in which firms
that failed the gateway test relocated their employees from U.K. to foreign countries. This
result is consistent for regions that were exposed to firms failing the gateway test (column 1)
6Note that I do not estimate the secotral regressions for mining and construction in foreign countries due
to small sample size.
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and those regions that were exposed to firms that reduced their employment in the United
Kingdom (column 2). In Table A1 in the Appendix, I show that exposed regions had a
higher unemployment rate and lower regional GDP in the United Kingdom after the WDC
as well. At the same time, exposed regions had lower unemployment and higher regional
GDP in foreign countries.
One may be concerned that after the WDC and the financial crisis regions that were more
exposed to MNCs did economically worse and that can be reflected in higher unemployment,
lower regional GDP and fewer jobs available. Results from columns 3 in Table 3 show that
this is not the case. I find no significant effect of WDC on regions that were simply more
exposed to MNCs , both in the United Kingdom and abroad.
Firm-level aggregated data In Table 3 in columns 4–5 I show results using aggregate
firm-level data. I find that in regions exposed to WDC in the United Kingdom, there is a
substantial reduction in aggregated number of people employed by MNCs. The magnitude
of the effect suggests a 17 percent decline in the number of people employed by MNCs in
those regions relative to regions without MNCs that failed the gateway test in the United
Kingdom. In foreign countries, I find an increase in the number of people employed by MNCs
in regions that were more exposed to WDC. These results are qualitatively similar to the
regional ones. Note that the estimated magnitudes are quantitatively different than using
regional data, likely because FAME and ORBIS data do not have a complete coverage of all
firms in each region.
5.1 Mechanisms and magnitudes
The firm-level reallocation of labor appears to have large local labor market effects both
in the United Kingdom and abroad. In spite of the fact that we observe similar magnitude
of the firm-level reduction of employment in the United Kingdom and increase abroad, the
regional data suggest some asymmetries. The reduction in the county-city jobs available in
the United Kingdom is 3.2–3.9 percent in magnitude, while the foreign increase is larger,
5.0–7.5 percent. There are three potential reasons for this disparity in magnitudes. First,
as MNCs expand in the foreign locations where they reallocate employment, local labor
markets can experience productivity gains through supply-chain linkages (Alfaro and Chen,
2018; Javorcik, 2004). These can create larger local gains than the initial firm-level expansion,
which may affect local domestic firms as well, increasing local labor market size and reducing
unemployment. Thus the initial expansion is followed by further growth due to economies
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of scale. Note that I do not have sufficient prereform data to investigate the domestic labor
effects in foreign countries.
Second, the initial decline in firm-level employment by MNCs in the United Kingdom
persist until 2015 after which I observe an increase. This suggests that the negative shock
is not permanent and that affected firms eventually offset the effects of WDC. Third, in
the United Kingdom, I also find that domestic firms increased the number of people they
employed, but not necessarily in the regions exposed to WDC. This suggests that domestic
firms did not benefit from this negative shock by substituting labor locally, unlike in Desai
et al. (2009). However, it is entirely plausible that domestic labor substitution occurred in
regions not exposed to WDC; that is, not locally. This substitution would explain a much
smaller effect of the WDC on the U.K. local labor markets.
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Table 1: Regional Comparison: Means
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not exposed Exposed Diff t-test
Panel A: U.K. exposure
Population 320,815.633 647,096.396 −326,280.762 −1.221
Number of employed 137.700 343.572 −205.872 −1.378
Activity rate % 61.376 61.598 −0.222 −0.222
Unemployment rate 8.200 8.596 −0.396 −0.747
GDP 8,261.479 25,583.157 −17,321.678 −1.267
Panel B: Foreign exposure
Population 951,309.078 2,079,438.818 −1,128,129.740* −1.914
Number of employed 475.552 1,154.213 −678.661* −2.035
Activity rate % 57.354 58.435 −1.081 −0.812
Unemployment rate 11.684 9.172 2.512** 2.374
GDP 28,082.979 73,839.150 -45,756.171** −2.237
NOTE: This table presents mean characteristics of regions in the treated and control groups in
2010. Exposed to failed MNC is 1 when a region has at least one MNC that failed the gate-
way test and we observe employment for that MNCs subsidiary. In Panel A, I show statistics
for U.K. regions. There are 68 unexposed and 56 exposed regions in Panel A. In Panel B, I
show statistics for foreign regions. There are 185 unexposed and 10 exposed regions in Panel A.
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Table 2: Firm-Level Baseline Results
Dep.var log empl (1) (2) (3)
MNEs domestic MNEs




Year FE X X X
Firm FEs X X X
Sample U.K. non-U.K.
Observations 69,594 20,336 336,141
# firms 9,470 13,858 51,841
Mean 4.037 3.685 3.939
NOTE: In columns 1 and 3, treated is equal to 1 when MNC failed the gateway test in 2010.
In column 2, treated is equal to 1 when the region was exposed to WDC by having at least one
MNC that failed the gateway test. Post is equal to 1 from 2011 onward. Standard errors clus-
tered at the firm level. The sample spans years 2007–2018. I am not able to include the effect of
the WDC on domestic operations in foreign countries, since I only have data after 2011 for them.
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Table 3: Regional Level Results: Number of Jobs
Dep.var. log empl (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exposed to Large empl Exposed Exposed to Large empl
failed firms change MNEs failed firms change
Regional data Firm-level data
Panel A: U.K. regions
treated=1 × post=1 −0.039*** −0.032*** −0.017 −0.168* −0.219**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.095) (0.101)
Observations 1,586 1,586 1,586 543 447
# Regions 122 122 122 255 268
Mean 5.039 5.039 5.039 5.077 5.076
Panel B: Foreign regions
treated=1 × post=1 0.050** 0.075** −0.017 0.031*** 0.026**
(0.020) (0.030) (0.012) (0.010) (0.156)
Observations 3,955 3,955 3,955 2,394 2,398
# Regions 644 644 644 922 921
Mean 5.764 5.764 5.764 5.825 5.826
Year FE X X X X X
Region FEs X X X X X
NOTE: Treated is equal to 1 in columns 1 and 4 when a region is exposed to at least one
MNC that failed the gateway test. In columns 2 and 5, treated is equal to 1 when a re-
gion is exposed to at least one MNC that reduced employment following the WDC, and in
column 3, treated is equal to 1 when a region in exposed to MNCs presence at all; post is
equal to 1 from 2011 onward. Here, I use only subsample until 2014. In all columns I con-
trol for log of population in each region. Standard errors clustered at the county-city level.
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Region: Failed gateway test Region: Did not fail gateway test
C. Domestic firms
NOTE: In Panels A and B, treated is equal to 1 when MNC failed the gateway test in 2010 (red
line with circles); control is equal to 1 when MNC did not fail the gateway test in 2010 (blue line
with hollow diamonds). In Panel C, region is treated when there is at least one MNC that failed
the gateway test in that region. Region is not treated if there were no MNCs exposed to WDC in
that region. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. The sample spans years 2007–2018. Panel
A includes employment in MNCs in the United Kingdom, Panel B includes employment in MNCs
in foreign countries, and Panel C includes employment in domestic firms in the United Kingdom.
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not London: Failed gateway test not London: Did not fail gateway test
C. Outside of London
NOTE: In Panel A, I compare the main difference-in-difference coefficient for London and
outside of London sample; 30% of MNCs are located in London. In Panel B, I com-
pare sectors within London, and in Panel C, the same sectors outside of London. I ex-
clude agriculture because there is not enough variation to estimate that for London.
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C. Sectoral changes - foreign
NOTE: In Panel A, I compare the main difference in difference coefficient for London and out-
side of London sample; 30% of MNCs are located in London. In Panel B, I compare sec-
tors within London, and in Panel C, the same sectors outside of London. I exclude agricul-
ture because there is not enough variation to estimate that for London. In Panel C, I repli-
cate this analysis for foreign firms. There is not enough variation in mining and construction.
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Appendices
Table A1: Regional-Level Results: Unemployment and GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exposed to Large empl Exposed Exposed to Large empl Exposed to
failed firms change MNEs failed firms change MNEs
dep. var. log unemployment log GDP
Panel A: U.K. regions
treated=1 × post=1 0.039** 0.048** 0.036 −0.023*** −0.025*** −0.025*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.041) (0.007) (0.007) (0.015)
Observations 1,560 1,560 1,560 754 754 754
# firms 123 123 123 123 123 123
Mean 4.996 4.996 4.996 5.045 5.045 5.045
Panel B: Foreign regions
treated=1 × post=1 −0.136* −0.182** −.242*** 0.034* 0.049** 0.025
(0.073) (0.128) (0.049) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020)
Observations 3,792 3,792 3,792 911 911 911
# Regions 640 640 640 566 566 566
Mean 5.777 5.777 5.777 5.739 5.739 5.739
Year FEs X X X X X X
Region FEs X X X X X X
NOTE: The dependent variable is logarithm of unemployment rate in columns 1–3 and loga-
rithm of GDP in columns 4–6. Treated is 1 in columns 1 and 4 when a region is exposed
to at least one MNC that failed the gateway test. In columns 2 and 5, treated is 1 when
a region is exposed to at least one MNC that reduced employment following the WDC, and
in columns 3 and 6, treated is 1 when a region in exposed to MNCs presence at all; post is
equal to 1 from 2011 onward. Here, I use only subsample until 2014. In all columns I con-
trol for log of population in each region. Standard errors clustered at the county-city level.
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Table A2: Regional Comparison: Means, Alternative Exposure Definition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Not exposed Exposed Diff t-test
Panel A: U.K. exposure
Population 324,981.441 693,635.819 −368,654.378 −1.194
Number of employed 143.235 368.984 −225.748 −1.305
Activity rate % 61.355 61.685 −0.331 −0.293
Unemployment rate 8.290 8.528 −0.238 −0.424
GDP 8,775.283 27,655.851 −18,880.568 −1.192
Panel B: Foreign exposure
Population 1,002,886.421 2,845,212.800 −1,842,326.379 −1.808
Number of employed 520.082 1,548.790 −1,028.708 −1.529
Activity rate % 57.227 62.519 −5.292*** −3.956
Unemployment rate 11.575 7.525 4.050** 2.407
GDP 31,195.593 98,896.807 −67,701.214 −1.670
NOTE: This table presents mean characteristics of regions in the treated and control groups in
2010. Exposed to failed MNC is 1 when a region has at least one MNC that failed the gateway
test, and we observe employment decline for that MNCs subsidiary. In Panel A I show statis-
tics for U.K. regions. There are 68 unexposed and 56 exposed regions in panel A. In Panel B I
show statistics for foreign regions. There are 176 unexposed and 8 exposed regions in Panel A.
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Table A3: List of Cities Included in the Regional Analysis
Aberdeen City City of London Liverpool South Tyneside
Barking and Dagenham Colchester Luton Southampton
Barnet Coventry Maidstone Southend-on-Sea
Barnsley Crawley Manchester St Albans
Basildon Croydon Mansfield St. Helens
Basingstoke and Deane Darlington Middlesbrough Stevenage
Bath, NE Somerset Derby Milton Keynes Stockport
Bedford Derry & Strabane Newcastle upon Tyne Stockton-on-Tees
Bexley Doncaster North East Lincolnshire Stoke-on-trent
Birmingham Dudley North Lanarkshire Sunderland
Blackburn with Darwen Dundee City North Tyneside Sutton
Blackpool East Staffordshire Northampton Swansea
Bolton Eastbourne Norwich Swindon
Bournemouth Enfield Nottingham Tamworth
Bracknell Forest Exeter Nuneaton, Bedworth Telford, Wrekin
Bradford Falkirk Oldham Tunbridge Wells
Brent Gateshead Oxford Wakefield
Brighton and Hove Glasgow City Peterborough Walsall
Bristol Gloucester Plymouth Warrington
Bromley Great Yarmouth Poole Warwick
Burnley Guildford Portsmouth Wigan
Bury Harlow Preston Wirral
Cambridge Harrow Reading Woking
Cannock Chase Hartlepool Redditch Wolverhampton
Cardiff Hastings Richmond u. Thames Worcester
Carlisle Hounslow Rochdale Worthing
Chelmsford Ipswich Rotherham Wrexham
Cheltenham Kingston u.Thames Salford Wycombe
Cheshire West, Chester Leeds Sheffield York
Chesterfield Leicester Slough
City of Edinburgh Lincoln Solihull
NOTE: This is the list of 122 cities with data for jobs and unemployment. MNCs in the United
Kingdom are located across 663 cities, but most of those do not report employment data to Eurostat.
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Figure A1: Map of U.K. Counties: Exposure
A. Exposure to WDC B. Exposure to MNEs
NOTE: U.K. counties, Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, level 3. The dis-
tricts of England (also known as local authority districts or local government districts to dis-
tinguish from unofficial city districts) are a level of subnational division of England used
for the purposes of local government. In Panel A: exposure to WDC: in orange are coun-
ties that were not exposed to WDC, in yellow counties with small exposure and in green
counties with large exposure. In Panel B: in red small exposure to MNCs, in green
large. In the remaining countries, we do not have any multinational firms in our dataset.
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Figure A2: Map of U.K. Counties: Jobs and Unemployment
A. Number of jobs available B. Unemployment rate
NOTE: U.K. counties, Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, level 3. The dis-
tricts of England (also known as local authority districts or local government districts to dis-
tinguish from unofficial city districts) are a level of subnational division of England used
for the purposes of local government. In Panel A: number of jobs available from Euro-
stat. Panel B: unemployment rate from Eurostat. All data in 2009, one year before
WDC. In the remaining countries, we do not have any multinational firms in our dataset.
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Figure A3: Map of the World: WDC and MNE Exposure
Panel A: World map, WDC exposure
Panel B: Europe availability of jobs data
NOTE: Data from Orbis and FAME, BvD matched with Eurostat employment information.
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